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majority opinion that a trust that continues beyond the 
statutory period must always fail are not justified under the 
Civil Code and should be disapproved or overruled. Of 
course, if restrictions in the trust instrument prevent transfer 
of an absolute interest in possession, alienation is restrained 
in violation of the statute. But when, as here, the interests 
vest at the expiration of a life in being at the time of creation 
of the trust, and the settlor has not restrained the bene-
ficiaries' power of alienation by means of a spendthrift clause, 
there is no restraint on alienation. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
17, 1952. 
[S. F. No. 18116. In Bank. Dec. 27, 1951.] 
Estate of KAZAR HAROOTENIAN, Deceased. GEORGE 
HAROOTENIAN, as Executor, etc., Proponent and 
Respondent, v. SYBLE JANIGAN et al., Contestants 
and Respondents; JEAN HAROOTENIAN, Intervener 
and Appellant. 
[1] Wills-Appeal-Judgments Appealable.-An appeal lies from 
a judgment of dismissal following the final order in proceed-
ings to revoke probate of a will. (Pro b. Code, § 1240; Code 
Civ. Proc., § 963.) 
[2a, 2b] !d.-Contest-Intervention.-It is immaterial that inter-
vention in a pending timely-filed will contest occurs after the 
statute of limitations has run. (Pro b. Code, §§ 380, 1233; 
Code Civ. Proc., § 387.) 
[3] !d.-Contest-Who May Institute-Beneficiaries Under Prior 
Will.-A prima facie cause entitling petitioner to contest a 
probated will is stated in a petition to revoke probate alleging 
that he is a legatee under a prior will. 
[4] Id.-Contest-Intervention.-Where a will contest is unad-
judicated when an intervention is filed, the court has juris-
diction to try all the issues on behalf of all the parties and 
does not lose it merely by reason that pursuant to the court's 
[3] See 26 Cal.Jur. 1082; 57 Am.Jur. 541. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, §548; [2,4] Wills, §495; [3] 
Wills, § 483(4); [5] Equity, § 37(3); [6] Wills, § 483(6). 
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control of order of proof the original contestant's interest is 
deemed insufficient before a complete trial on all issues in 
behalf of all parties is had. 
[5] Equity-Laches.-A plea that an mtervener in a will contest 
was guilty of laches in filing her complaint is not sustained 
where no change affecting the parties' legal rights or any 
financial loss is asserted to have resulted from the delay in 
filing. 
[6] Wills- Contest- Who May Institute- Creditors.-A disin-
hei·ited heir's judgment creditor who has perfected a lien when 
the ancestor's real property would devolve to the heir if the 
ancestor's will were set aside has an interest in the devolution 
which makes him an interested person who may contest the 
will. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno 
County. Ernest Klette, Judge. Reversed with directions. 
Will contest. Judgment of dismissal after order sustaining 
demurrer to, and order granting motion to dismiss, an amended 
complaint in intervention, reversed with directions. 
Philander Brooks Beadle and Morton L. Silvers for Inter-
vener and .Appellant. 
Leon .A. Blum, David E. Peckinpah and L. N. Barber for 
Respondents. 
SHENK, J.-[1] This is an appeal from a judgment of 
dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer to and an 
order granting a motion to dismiss an amended complaint in 
intervention in a will contest. The judgment followed the 
final order in proceedings to revoke the probate of the will 
and is appealable. (Prob. Code, § 1240; Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 963; Estate of Baker, 170 Cal. 578, 583 [150 P. 989]; Estate 
of Katz, 49 Cal.App.2d 82 [120 P.2d 896] .) 
The record shows the following : Kazar Harootenian, a 
widower, died on March 3, 1947. A brief instrument desig-
nated as his last will and testament was dated February 27, 
1947. It mentioned his four adult children, George, Samuel, 
.Agnes and Syble. They survived the decedent. The dece-
dent bequeathed $1,500 to the son Samuel, all the rest of his 
estate to the daughter Agnes, and expressly disinherited 
George and Syble. George was named executor without 
bond and with power to dispose of the property without order 
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of court. Some illegible marks or writing appeared with the 
decedent's name at the end of the will followed by an attesta-
tion clause subscribed by two witnesses. 
On March 24, 1947, George filed a petition for probate of 
the will and for letters testamentary. On April 5th Samuel 
and Syble filed a contest resisting the probate of the will on 
the grounds that the instrument was not signed by the de-
cedent but by another; that the formalities of execution were 
not complied with; that the decedent was then suffering from 
a broken spine, fractures and contusions, was confined to bed 
in a hospital, was physically helpless, feeble and infirm in 
mind and body, and was not of sound and disposing mind ; 
that the attempted signing of the instrument was not his free 
and voluntary act but was procured by the undue influence 
of George and Agnes with the intent to obtain the greater 
part of the estate for themselves. George and Agnes filed an 
answer to the contest admitting the alleged physical condi-
tion of the decedent but denied other allegations. On May 
9, 194 7, the contest was withdrawn and dismissed with 
prejudice pursuant to a stipulation and agreement among 
all the heirs. Thereby Samuel remitted the bequest which 
became a part of the residue. Agnes as residuary legatee 
agreed to the distribution to Samuel and Syble jointly of a 
one-half interest in the Harootenian ranch property in Fresno 
County, or one half the proceeds of the sale thereof, and all 
agreed that the ranch be sold as soon as possible. Assets of 
the estate were listed as the ranch property, an apartment 
house in San Mateo County, a bank account of approximately 
$8,600, furniture and personal belongings. Property there-
after discovered was to be divided one half jointly to Samuel 
and Syble, the other half to Agnes. The attorneys acting 
for Samuel and Syble were nominated to act for George in the 
sale of the ranch. 
Upon the filing of the agreement and on May 12, 1947, 
the court admitted the will to probate and appointed George 
as executor. On November 19, 1947, George tendered his resig-
nation dated in Nevada because of his removal to that state, 
and Agnes and Syble were appointed administratices with the 
will annexed. 
Within the six months' limitation period of section 380 of 
the Probate Code, and on November 10, 1947, Haig Harooten-
ian, minor son of George and Jean Harootenian, through the 
latter as his guardian ad litem, filed a contest of the will and a 
petition to revoke probate. The contestant alleged that he 
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was a legatee under a prior valid will of the decedent; that 
the prior will was left in the possession and custody of George 
and Agnes who concealed the instrument, that the will ad-
mitted to probate was not the will of the decedent, was not 
executed in accordance with the required formalities, and was 
otherwise invalid on the same grounds as alleged in the con-
test of Samuel and Syble. George, Agnes, Samuel and Syble 
filed an answer containing denials of all allegations with the 
exception that they admitted the relationship and that at the 
time of the execution of the probated will the decedent was 
suffering from a broken spine, fractures and contusions and 
was confined to bed in a hospital. 
On March 28, 1949, by leave of court, a complaint in inter-
vention on the same grounds of contest was filed by Jean 
Harootenian as a judgment creditor of George. On April 
5, 1949, the trial commenced. At the close of the contestant 
Haig's evidence as to the existence of the alleged prior con-
cealed will, the proponents moved to dismiss on the ground 
that the evidence was insufficient to support Haig's claim of 
interest, namely, that there was a prior will in which he was 
named as legatee. The motion to dismiss Haig's contest was 
granted and the order thereon entered on April 16, 1949. 
The amended complaint in intervention was filed by leave 
of court on August 8, 1949. Proponents filed a demurrer 
thereto and moved for dismissal on the grounds that there 
was not pending a contest in which the contestant could in-
tervene and that the intervention was barred by the time 
limitation of section 380 of the Probate Code. As first in-
dicated herein the trial court sustained the demurrer, granted 
the motion, and dismissed the proceedings in intervention. 
[2a] The first question is whether the complaint in inter-
vention was filed within the six months' limitation of section 
380 of the Probate Code. There is no question as to the timely 
filing of the contest initiated by Haig as an alleged legatee 
under a prior will. Nor may it be questioned that the allega-
tions of Haig's petition showed him to be an interested per-
son who may contest the validity of the will. [3] The 
pleadings filed by him alleged a prima facie cause entitling 
him to contest the probated will as a legatee under a prior 
will. (Estate of Lancl, 166 Cal. 538 [137 P. 246] ; Estate of 
Pla~d, 27 Cal.2d 424 [164 P.2d 765, 162 A.L.R. 837] .) 
It is the settled law of this state that an interested person 
may intervene on the same grounds of contest at any time 
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before the trial of a pending proceeding to revoke probate 
of the will initiated by another interested person. A will 
contest is in the nature of a proceeding in rem. [2b] It is im-
material that the intervention in a pending timely contest 
occurs after the lapse of the limited period, and the party's 
voluntary dismissal of the pending contest will not affect the 
right of the intervener to a trial on the issues raised by him. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 387; Pro b. Code, § 1233; Voyce v. Superior 
Court, 20 Cal.2d 479 [127 P.2d 536]; Estate of Butzow, 21 
Cal.App.2d 96 [68 P.2d 374] .) The proponents do not 
seriously question these principles, but contend that they 
are inapplicable because on the trial Haig· was unable to 
produce sufficient evidence of the existence of the alleged 
prior will and his contest was dismissed for failure to prove 
his interest. Thus the dismissal was not a voluntary dis-
missal by the party but was a dismissal by the court after 
trial on the merits of the preliminary issue. A voluntary dis-
missal by a party will not be permitted to defeat the statu-
tory right of intervention by preventing trial on the grounds 
of the contest. But to give the claimed effect to the court's 
judgment of dismissal would likewise nullify the statutory 
right. That right inheres at any time before trial. An in-
tervention which is timely and proper before trial cannot 
be defeated after trial by the finding on an issue which does 
not dispose of the merits of the issues tendered by the inter-
vener. If the contestant by a voluntary dismissal may not 
defeat the intervener's right to a trial of the cause, there 
is likewise no reason why a dismissal entered by the court 
should have that adverse effect, and the proponents present 
no case in point so declaring. In the only case relied on the 
noninterest of the original contestant was shown on the face 
of the pleadings. (See Russell v. Nelson, 317 Mo. 148 [295 
S.W. 118] .) That case is distinguishable for that reason. 
The policy underlying the rule that the dismissal of the 
cause as to one party will not affect the rights of a party not 
yet heard is that which permits all persons entitled to a hear-
ing to have their day in court. True the court does not 
have jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding to revoke probate 
which is barred by the time limitation, and will be restrained 
from exercising jurisdiction in such a case. (Estate of Smith, 
214 Cal. 50 [3 P.2d 921]; Scott v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. 
App. 513, 516 [14 P.2d 99].) [4] But that is not to say 
that when jurisdiction once attaches the court may be halted 
before all parties are heard because pursuant to its discretion 
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relating to the order of proof ( cf. Estate of Land, 166 Cal. 
538, 540 [137 P. 246] ), the original contestant's evidence 
on the issue of his interest was deemed insufficient. The court 
did not lose jurisdiction of the entire contest and other par-
ties by the dismissal of one, the original contestant, on a 
partial trial. The contest was unadjudicated at the time the 
intervention was :filed and the court had jurisdiction to try 
all of the issues of the contest on behalf of all the parties 
before it, in whatever order of proof it might specify. That 
jurisdiction continued until the entire controversy was :finally 
disposed of as to all of the contestants. It follows that 
the judgment or dismissal of the complaint in intervention 
is insupportable on the ground of the alleged bar of section 380 
of the Probate Code. 
[5] The pleadings disclose that the plea of laches inter-
posed by demurrer and motion is also unavailing. Nothing is 
thus shown by which the rights of the proponents could be 
prejudiced on account of the delay in filing the complaint 
in intervention. The lapse of time alone is not sufficient to 
support the plea. No change affecting the legal rights of the 
p~rties nor any :financial loss is indicated. No circumstances 
or facts are alleged which would sustain the judgment of 
dismissal on that ground. ( CaMll v. Superior Court, 145 
Cal. 42, 47 [78 P. 467]; Thornton v. Middletown Educational 
Corp., 21 Cal.App.2d 707, 711 [70 P.2d 234] .) The inter-
vener is therefore entitled to a trial on the merits of the con-
test if she is an interested person who may contest the will. 
It is also alleged that prior to the events hereinabove re-
lated, George and Jean, the parents of Haig, had been sep-
arated, that the wife had been awarded support by court 
decree, and that on January 27, 1947, which was prior to the 
death of George's father, Jean obtained a judgment against 
George for unpaid support. An execution which issued in 
March, 1949, indicated that there was then due on the judg-
ment $8,668.82. 
Section 370 of the Probate Code provides that before pro-
bate "any person interested" may contest the will. Section 
380 provides that ''any interested person'' other than a party 
to a contest before probate and a person who had actual no-
tice of such previous contest in time to have joined therein, 
may contest the will at any time within six months after pro-
bate. The proponents do not contend that the order on the 
demurrer or on the .motion to dismiss is supported on the 
ground that the intervener had actual notice of or oppor-
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tunity to participate in the short-lived contest before probate. 
The question then is whether a judgment creditor of a dis-
inherited heir of the decedent is a person interested within 
the meaning of the sections. That question does not appear 
to have been directly involved in previous cases in this state. 
It has been declared as settled that an interested per-
son is one who has an interest of a pecuniary nature which 
may be impaired or defeated by the probate of the will or 
benefited by setting it aside. (Estate of Platd, supra, 27 Cal. 
2d 424, 425-426.) The interest is not necessarily con-
fined to that of an heir who would take by succession if the 
will be set aside. In Estate of Plaut and in Estate of Land 
(supra, 166 Cal. 538), it was recognized that a legatee under 
a prior will, not an heir, was a person who might be bene-
fited by setting aside the will. Nor is it necessary that 
the impairment or benefit be established as a certainty. A 
prima facie showing of an interest is enough. (Estate of 
Plaut, supra, 27 Cal.2d at pp. 427-428.) However, a re-
mote possibility of escheat is insufficient to support a claim 
of interest by the state. (State v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. 
55 [82 P. 672, 2 L.R.A.N.S. 643] .) Nor is a debtor of the 
estate a person whose pecuniary interest would be affected 
by the probate of the will. (Estate of B1:ly, 96 Cal.App.2d 333 
[215 P.2d 78, 15 A.L.R.2d 861] .) 
In Sparks v. De la Guerra, 14 Cal. 108, 18 Cal. 676, the 
plaintiff, a judgment creditor of an heir, by actions against 
the executors, unsuccessfully attempted to reach the assets 
of an alleged secret trust created in the executors for the 
benefit of the heir. The cases did not involve a contest of the 
will. 
In San Diego Trust etc. Bank v. Heustis, 121 Cal.App. 
675 [10 P.2d 158], the testatrix created a spendthrift trust 
for her son, obviously to protect him from a judgment held by 
his wife. Execution issued and was levied on the assets in 
possession of the executor-trustee. The latter filed an action 
for declaratory relief to determine whether the wife could 
satisfy the judgment from the trust property. By answer 
filed more than six months after probate the wife sought to 
attack the will as invalid on various grounds. On her appeal 
from an adverse judgment on the pleadings it was correctly 
determined that the answer as an attack on the validity of the 
will was too late. The court also stated that since the wife 
was not an heir of the deceased nor a legatee under the will, 
she was a mere stranger, not entitled to notice of the probate 
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proceedings, and therefore not an interested person, citing 
State v. Superior Court, supra (148 Cal. 55). The question 
of the pecuniary interest of a judgment creditor of the heir 
was not considered. 
Authorities with little conflict agree that a general credi-
tor of a disinherited heir has not sufficient interest to con-
test the will; that there must have been created some right 
or interest in the creditor which will attach to the property 
on devolution to the heir if the will be invalid. The authori-
ties are divided as to whether a judgment creditor of the heir 
has such an interest. None questions that a parent has 
the right to make a valid will disinheriting a child. But if 
through fraud or undue influence or other circumstance the 
will is not the product of the mind of the putative testator. 
or is not a validly executed will a judgment lien creditor of 
the disinherited heir is in the majority of the cases held to be 
a person who has a pecuniary interest which will be impaired 
by admitting the instrument to probate or be benefited by 
setting aside the probate thereof. 
In Bloor v. Platt ( 1908), 78 Ohio St. 46 [ 84 N.E. 604, 14 
Ann. Cas. 332], it was stated that a lien creditor could not 
with justice or reason be denied his day in court to prove that 
a paper purporting to be a will and obviously designed to de-
feat creditors of the heir is not in fact a valid testament. It 
was held that "any interested person" meant interested per-
sons in addition to devisees, legatees, heirs, executors and ad-
ministrators, and included any person who has such a direct, 
immediate and legally ascertained pecuniary interest in the 
devolution of the estate as would be impaired or defeated by 
the probate of the will or be benefited by setting it aside, and 
that a judgment creditor was such a person. That and other 
cases establish the distinction between the right of contest of 
a general creditor of an heir who has no vested right, claim 
or interest to be defeated or established by the probate or 
rejection of the will, and the right of a judgment lien creditor 
who generally is entitled to assail or defend against anything 
that may divest his lien. Although the lien creditor has 
no interest in the estate of the decedent as such, his lien 
attaches the moment title is vested in the heir by descent. 
It is not interest in the estate as such which determines his 
right. [6] It is his interest in the devolution of the estate which 
establishes the right of contest. In In re Duffy's Estate 
(1940), 228 Iowa 426 [292 N.W. 165, 167, 128 A.L.R. 943], it 
was pointed out that if the common law still prevailed, in 
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ejectment a lien creditor could defeat a title under an invalid 
will; and that there should exist no good reason why he could 
not do so under the statutory proceeding. After reviewing 
numerous conflicting cases the court held the lien creditor to 
be a person interested in accord with what was deemed the 
weight of authority. The common law method of contest 
available to a judgment creditor of an heir was also noted 
in Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333 [48 S.W. 478, 69 Am.St. 
Rep. 615], where it was held that a lien creditor of the heir 
was entitled to contest a will disinheriting the heir since there 
was no difference in principle between the right of the heir 
and that of his judgment creditor. In Smith v. Bradstreet 
(1833), 16 Pick. (Mass.) 264, it was also said that the interests 
of the heir and his judgment creditor in the probate of the 
will were identical. As observed in In re Van Doren's Es-
tate (1935), 119 N.J.Eq. 80 [180 A. 841], obviously it could 
not be said that a judgment creditor of an heir would not 
be injured by the probate of an invalid will disinheriting the 
heir. 
In 68 Corpus Juris 906, the general rule with citation of 
cases is stated as above, viz : that the creditor of the heir has 
not such an interest as will entitle him to contest the will ex-
cept where he is an attachment or judgment creditor whose 
lien will attach when title vests in the heir. In 57 American 
Jurisprudence, p. 551, it is stated that the well-considered 
cases hold that a judgment creditor of an heir has a sufficient 
interest to contest a will under which the heir is to take 
nothing, if the judgment lien would attach on the property's 
passing under the laws of succession. (See, also, cases col-
lected in notes 46 A.L.R. 1490 and 128 A.L.R. 963.) 
It follows from the foregoing authorities and the statutes 
giving "any interested person" the right of contest, that a 
judgment creditor who has perfected a lien at the time the 
property would devolve to the heir if the will be set aside is an 
interested person who may contest the will. 
The record on this appeal shows that if the will be held in-
valid there is real property, title to which would pass by dev-
olution under the laws of succession. A judgment lien may 
be established on the real property of a judgment debtor by 
filing an abstract of the judgment or decree "with the re-
corder of any county and from such recording the judgment 
or decree becomes a lien upon all the real property of the 
judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in such county, 
owned by him at the time, or which he may afterwards and 
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before the lien expires, acquire." (Code Civ. Pro c., § 67 4.) 
Under the laws of succession the title to real property devolves 
on the heirs at law as of the time of the death of the dece-
dent. (Prob. Code, § 300.) The contestant alleged generally 
that she was a judgment creditor of the disinherited heir at 
the time of the death of the decedent. The motion to dismiss 
was made on the grounds that there was no contest pending in 
which the contestant could intervene and that the complaint in 
intervention was filed too late. That motion was granted. The 
dismissal on the stated grounds foreclosed the request for per-
mission to allege by amendment additional f~J,cts relating to the 
specific lien required to bring the contestant within the class de-
clared to be interested persons who might contest the will. The 
absence of such request is deemed not to affect the proper judg-
ment of this court based on the conclusion that the trial court 
erred in dismiss;ng the complaint in intervention. The cause 
should be reinstated with an opportunity to the plaintiff by 
amendment to bring herself, if she can do so, within the class 
of judgment lien creditors entitled to contest a will disin-
heriting a judgment debtor. 
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court 
to proceed in accordance with the views herein expressed. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of reversal but 
do not agree with the reasoning in the majority opinion that 
the right of a creditor of an heir to contest a will is limited 
to a judgment creditor whose judgment may be a lien upon 
real property which would descend to the heir in case the will 
is set aside. 
The question of whether a creditor of an heir may contest 
a will of the testator was settled recently by this court in 
Estate of Kalt, 16 Cal.2d 807 [108 P.2d 401, 133 A.L.R. 1424], 
a case which is not mentioned in the majority opinion. There 
we were considering whether the creditor of a legatee under 
a will could prevent the renunciation of the legacy by the 
legatee. We held he could and in so doing held that the case 
was analogous to a contest of a will by a creditor of an heir, 
stating (p. 814): "A creditor who is legally entitled to set 
aside a fra.udulent conveyance may exercise the debtor's right 
to contest a will even though the debtor himself does not wish 
to do so. (Brooks v. Paine, 123 Ky. 271 [90 S.W. 600] ; In 
re Langevin's Will, 45 Minn. 429 [47 N.W. 1133]; Bloor v. 
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Platt, 78 Ohio St. 46 [84 N.E. 605, 14 Ann. Cas. 332] .) If the 
creditor contested the will successfully it would be ironic 
to leave the debtor free to renounce the ensuing benefits. A 
debtor may be compelled not only to retain his property for 
the benefit of his creditors, but to dispose of it for the same 
purpose. There is a like obligation upon him of which he may 
acquit himself without hardship, to avail himself of a bequest. 
The denial to the debtor of the right to renounce as against 
his creditors in fact benefits his own economic interests as 
well as those of his creditors." (Italics added.) It will 
be noted in the foregoing that a creditor who is legally en-
titled to set aside a fraudulent conveyance may contest a will. 
In the forepart of the opinion it is stated that under the Uni-
form Fraudulent Conveyance Act (Civ. Code,§§ 3439-3440.5) 
the creditor who may set aside a fraudulent transfer need not 
be a judgment creditor nor have a lien. It follows, therefore, 
that, contrary to the majority opinion, a general creditor 
may contest a will. Furthermore, it will be noted that the 
Kalt case cites Brooks v. Paine, 123 Ky. 271 [90 S.W. 600], 
for its statement to this effect. It was there held that a gen-
eral creditor of an heir may contest a will which disinherits 
the heir. 
I can see no justification for requiring that the judgment 
creditor of an heir must have a lien on real property before 
he can contest the will, thus placing personal property beyond 
his reach. There may be policy reasons for requiring that 
the creditor have a judgment, such as, that the probate court 
is an inappropriate forum to litigate the question of whether 
the creditor is in fact such, and the heir, his alleged debtor, 
is not a party to the contest proceeding. There is no reason, 
however, for the lien requirement. The lien is tenuous at 
the best as it may be wiped out if the property is sold during 
probate. 
Finally, the holding by the majority can be made mean-
ingless by simple action by the creditor. The right to contest 
a will being a chose in action, is transferable. (Estate of 
Baker, 170 Cal. 578, 586 [150 P. 989] ; Estate of Clark, 94 
Cal.App. 453 [271 P. 542] .) It would appear, therefore, that 
a creditor may commence an action against the heir and at-
tach his right to contest the will (Code Civ. Proc., § 542 [b]) 
which would be substantially the same as a lien. 
I would therefore hold that both a judgment creditor and 
a creditor of an heir who has brought an action and effected 
a valid attachment of the interest of the heir in his share of 
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the assets of an estate has such an interest that he may con-
test a will which is so drawn as to deprive an heir of property 
that would have descended to him in the event of intestacy. 
Traynor, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-Courts have expressed many divergent 
conclusions in determining the "interest" which one must 
have to give him the right to contest a will. In my opinion, 
to allow either a creditor or a judgment creditor of a dis-
inherited heir to maintain such a contest, places an obstacle 
in the way of the prompt settlement of estates which cannot 
be justified upon any sound legal principle. 
A will contest is entirely the creature of statute. The sole 
standard established by the Legislature to determine the 
necessary qualifications of the person who may contest the 
probate of a will is stated in two phrases in the Probate Code. 
Section 370 permits ''any person interested'' to contest the 
will before probate. Section 380 allows ''any interested per-
son" to maintain a contest after probate if he has had no 
notice of a prior proceeding. No standard could be more 
vague and lacking in definition. What sort of interest must 
there be, and in what~ 
The Legislature might well have used the word in the sense 
of a property right. Or did it limit the proceeding to a per-
son with an expectation of pecuniary benefit 1 Giving effect 
to a broader connotation of the term, should it be construed as 
authorizing legal action by one who believes that the testator 
did not follow the highest moral principles in making pro-
vision for the devolution of his property~ By common defini-
tion, interest in an estate, without qualification of the term, 
may mean almost anything. It could include the motivation 
of one of asserted good purpose having no relationship to the 
deceased, nor the possibility of sharing in the estate, who be-
lieves that the property should be divided differently than the 
will specifies. 
Depending upon the phase of the law in which it is used, 
''interest'' or ''interested'' assumes a multitude of meanings. 
''The word 'interest' is used throughout the Restatement of 
this Subject to denote the object of any human desire." (Re-
statement of Torts, § 1.) ''The word 'interest' is used in the 
Restatement of this Subject both generically to include vary-
ing aggregates of rights, privileges, powers and immunities 
and distributively to mean any one of them. The creation of 
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interests may be either the creation of a new interest or the 
change or abolition of an existing interest." (Restatement 
of Conflict of Laws, § 42b.) 
''In its ordinary signification among men of all classes 
... [the word 'interest'] is broad enough to include any 
right, title, or estate in, or lien upon real estate. One who 
holds a mortgage upon a piece of land for half its value is 
commonly and truthfully said to be interested, to have an 
interest in it .... " (Or'msby v. Ottman, 29 C.C.A.. 295 [85 
F. 492, 497] .) Definitions of "interest" or "interested" 
could be multiplied seemingly without end. (See 22 Words 
and Phrases p. 38 et seq.; Black's Law Dictionary [3d ed., 
1933] 996; Ballentine's Law Dictionary [1930] 670.) 
Even when applied to the comparatively narrow field of 
probate of an estate, the term has been given a variety of 
meanings. "It is an elementary proposition that the only 
persons authorized to contest or seek revocation of the probate 
of a will are those who, but for the will, would succeed in some 
degree to the decedent's estate." (In re Pepin's Estate, 
53 Mont. 240 [163 P. 104, 105] .) A. purchaser of an interest 
in the lands of the decedent was held to be a person interested 
in the estate. (McCarthy v. Texas Co., (Tex.Civ.A.pp.) 235 
S.W. 679, 681.) An administrator de bonis non is a party 
interested in the estate. (Balch v. Hooper, 32 Minn. 158 
[20 N.W.124, 125].) 
"The word 'interest', in its ordinary, accepted meaning, 
embracE's both a vested and a contingent interest and the 
word 'interested' is defined as 'having an interest ; having 
a share or concern in some project or affair; involved; liable 
to be affected or prejudiced; . . . not disinterested. . . . ' '' 
(In re Brown's Estate, 24 Cal.A.pp.2d 573, 575 [75 P.2d 
658].) ''A. 'person interested', within the contemplation of 
this statute, undoubtedly means a person who has such a 
direct pecuniary interest in the devolution of the testator's 
estate as would be impaired or defeated by the will, or be 
benefited by setting it aside." (Chilcote v. II offrnan, 97 Ohio 
St. 98 [119 N.E. 364, 366, L.R.A.. 1918D 575].) 
'l'he standard adopted by Mr. Justice Shenk is that "It is 
his interest in the devolution of the estate which establishes 
the right of contest." But with the restriction that the con-
t"stant must be one having a judgment lien, this means that, 
if the contest is successful, and i.f the real estate distributable 
to the debtor has not been sold during administration, and if 
that real estate is finally distributed to the debtor, the cred-
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itor then will have a property interest in the estate of the 
decedent. The qualification to maintain the proceeding can 
be determined only after a successful contest of the will and 
at the time the estate is ready for distribution. Authority 
to intrude upon the administration of an estate, with the con-
sequent delays and unrecoverable expense, should not rest 
upon such an uncertain basis. 
A lien on the real property of a judgment debtor located 
in a particular county may be obtained by recording an ab-
stract of the judgment in that county. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 674.) But that right does not extend to one who has ob-
tained his judgment in another state. And no lien is obtain-
able upon the personal property of a debtor. To allow one 
to contest a will solely upon the ground that he is a judgment 
creditor is wholly arbitrary and rests upon a construction of 
''any interested person'' unjustified by fundamental prin-
ciples governing probate procedure. The further require-
ment that the judgment must be a lien upon real property 
which might be distributed to the heir, is a distinction which 
has no rational basis in either probate law or the law govern-
ing creditors' rights. 
Mr. Justice Shenk says "the interest is not necessarily con-
fined to that of an heir who would take by succession if the 
will be set aside.'' But in every California case cited by him, 
the contestant was one who, upon a successful contest, would 
take directly from the testator, either by the terms of a former 
will or by succession. 
In Estate of Land, 166 Cal. 538 (137 P. 246], the contestant 
was a beneficiary under a former will. Even then, contest 
was denied because the pleadings established that he stood 
to gain no more under the former will than by the one he 
attacked. 
The contestant in Estate of Plant, 27 Cal.2d 424 [164 P.2d 
765, 162 A.L.R. 837], was a beneficiary under a former will. 
In Estate of Bily, 96 Cal.App.2d 333 [215 P.2d 78, 15 A.L.R. 
2d 861], a debtor of the estate was denied the right to contest. 
In San Diego Trust & Satrings Bank v. Heustis, 121 Cal. 
App. 675 [10 P.2d 158], the appellant stood in exactly the 
same position as Jean Harootenian. Although the decision 
was not based upon ''the pecuniary interest of a judgment 
creditor of the heir,'' the court said: 
''Appellant has no standing to contest the will because she 
is not a party interested as specified by the code, section 370 
of the Probate Code, formerly section 1307 of the Code of 
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Civil Procedure. (See State v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. 55 
[82 P. 672, 2 L.R.A.N.S. 643].) If she could not contest the 
will before probate, of course she could not afterward. Ap-
pellant was not an heir of deceased nor legatee under the 
will. She was a mere stranger, and was not entitled to any 
notice of the probate proceedings." (P. 681.) 
The Heustis case cites with approval State v. Superior 
Court, 148 Cal. 55 [82 P. 672, 2 L.R.A.N.S. 643], which was a 
proceeding in mandamus to compel the superior court to per-
mit the state to contest a will. The state claimed under a right 
of escheat. It was held that the possibility of escheat was too 
indirect an interest upon which to base a contest. 
The right to contest a will is simply a cause of action to 
invalidate a testamentary disposition which bars the contest-
ant from sharing in the estate of the decedent. (Estate of 
Baker, 170 Cal. 578, 585-586 [150 P. 989]; Estate of Clark, 
94 Cal.App. 453, 461 [271 P. 542] ; Estate of Morrison, 125 
Cal.App. 504, 507 [14 P.2d 102] ; Estate of Anthony, 127 Cal. 
App. 186, 189 [15 P.2d 531].) I would construe "any in-
terested person'' as meaning one who, if the will of the testator 
were set aside, would receive directly, and not through any 
third person, a part of the property of the estate. If the term 
is to be more broadly applied, the Legislature should spe-
cifically define the qualifications of a contestant. 
For these reasons, in my opinion, the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Spence, J., concurred. 
